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Wednesday, 16 December 2020

Answer to Modernism (2)

First Principles

Principle No. (1)

 

"One’s inability to understand something is no argument for its being false."

 

Explanation:

 

When we describe a thing as “false", we really mean to say that a clear and definite argument leads us to conclude that it does not exist. It is evident enough that these two facts- namely, the inability to understand that a certain thing exists, and the certain knowledge that it does not exist- are totally different from each other. The former (that is, the inability to understand that something exist) signifies that, for lack of observation, our mind has not been able to comprehend the causes and modes of its existence, and hence feels bewildered, and hesitates in determining these causes and modes. But, in this case, beyond wondering how such a thing could exist, our mind can produce no sound argument, rational or based on report, to establish its nonexistence. On the other hand, the latter (that is, the knowledge that the thing does not exist) signifies that our mind can produce a sound argument rational or based on report, to establish its nonexistence. For example, a rustic who has never chanced to see a railway train, comes to hear that there is a carriage which runs all by itself without being pulled by a beast. He would naturally be bewildered, and wonder as to how it could be so. But, at the same time, he would be unable to produce an argument to deny this fact, for he does not possess any argument even to prove that the fast and continued motion of a carriage can have no other cause than being pulled by a beast. This is what we call “the inability to understand.” If the rustic begins to deny the fact only on this ground and to refute the reporter, all sensible people would consider him a fool, and the basis of their judgment would be the elementary principle that if a man is unable to understand a certain thing, he is not necessarily entitled to deny its existence. This, then, is an illustration of "the inability to understand" the existence of a thing.

 

            Now, if a man boards a train at Kolkata, and get down at Delhi, and a second man comes and states in his presence that the train has today covered the journey between Kolkata and Delhi in one hour, the traveller would refute him. And we would possess an argument for this refutation- the argument being his own observation and the witness of one or two hundred other observers who have come by the same train. This is an illustration of proving the non-existence of a thing.

 

            In the same way, let us suppose that a man is told that on the day of judgement one will have to cross the bridge called "Sirat" which will be finer than a hair. Since no one has ever seen such a thing happen, it is natural enough that the man should wonder as to how it could be so. But it is also evident that his reason does not possess any argument to refute the statement. For, if there is an argument at all, it can apparently be only this- the human foot is so broad and the place where it is to be put is so narrow, hence it is not possible for the foot to rest on it and to walk on it. But one cannot even prove that it is rationally necessary that the breadth of path must be greater than that of the foot. Of course, we may concede that this is the habitual fact according to our observation, that we have not seen anything contrary to it, and if we have at all seen the contrary (for example, people walking on a rope), we have not found such a great difference of breadth. But is it really impossible that Allah, Who is omnipotent, may altogether change this natural or habitual law in the other world? The man, who denies this possibility on the basis of what has habitually been observed, would be placing himself in the position of the rustic who had denied that a railway train would run by itself without being pulled by a beast.

 

            Now, take a different kind of example, if a man were to hear someone declares that on the day of judgment, Allah the majestic would honour and exalt the offspring of a certain saint on account of their relationship to him, even without their being genuine Muslims, then such a belief would be repudiated and considered false, for there is a solid argument which proves just the opposite of this belief. The argument is this case being the clear teachings of the Shariah that an infidel cannot attain salvation.

This then, is the distinction between what one has not been able to understand and what is "false".

 

Tuesday, 15 December 2020

Answer to Modernism (1)

The Branches of "Hikmah" or Philosophy


             What the Greek and Muslim philosophers call "Hikmah" (wisdom), or philosophy, is a general term which does not exclude any science or branch of knowledge, and the Shariah is also included in it. This being so, we have to discuss here as to what "Hikmah" or philosophy is, and how it is classified.

            Philosophy is the knowledge of real entities as they are, the object of such knowledge being that the self acquires thereby some kind of excellence. Thus every science deals with the characteristics of a certain form of reality.

            Now, according to a primary classification, philosophy is of two kinds, for all the entities it deals with are either such actions and deeds whose existence lies within the scope of our will and power, or such entities whose existence does not lie within the scope of our will. The knowledge which pertains to the entities of the first kind is called "Practical Philosophy" (Al-hikmat-ul-Amaliyah), and that which pertains to the entities of the second kind is called "Theoretical Philosophy" (Al-Hikmat-ul-Nazariyyah).

            Then, each of these two branches of philosophy is further sub-divided into three kinds. For "practical philosophy" can either deal with the good of the individual in which case it is called "Ethics" (Tahdhib-ul-Akhlaq); or with the good of a group of individuals who live in the same house, in which case it is called "Domestic Economy[1]" (Tadbir-ul-Manzil); or with the good of a group which lives in the same town or country, in which case it is called “Politics” (Siyasat-ul-Madaniyyah).These are, then, the three branches of “Practical Philosophy.”

            As for “Theoretical Philosophy”, it deals either with the characteristics of such entities as do not intrinsically need any substance for their physical or ideal existence, in which case it is called “Metaphysics” (Ilahiyyat); or it deals with the characteristics of such entities as need a substance for their physical existence but not for their ideal existence in which case it is called “Mathematics” (Riadhi); or it deals with the characteristics of such entities as need a substance both for physical and ideal existence, in which case it is called “Physics” (Ilm-al-tabi’ah). These are, then, the three branches of “Theoretical Philosophy”.

            Thus we obtain these six branches of “Wisdom” of philosophy- namely, Ethics, Domestic Economy Politics, Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Physics. Although there are many more subdivisions, yet the principal classification of philosophy is confined only to these.

            Now, we must understand that the real object of the Shariah is to discipline human beings in such a way that they may make the fulfillment of their obligations to the Creator as well as of their obligations to the creatures, the means of gaining the pleasure of Allah. In fact, the injunctions of the Shariah with regard to these two duties yield the good of worldly life as well, and when they seem to go against worldly good it always turns out that public good has been given precedence over individual good, or that the situations entailed a spiritual harm greater than worldly good, which has been eliminated. All the same, the real object of the Shariah is the quest for the pleasure of Allah.

            On the other hand, mathematics and physics have nothing to do with the duty of fulfilling one’s obligations to God or to creatures. So, the Shariah has not dealt with these subjects as its proper object. If some topic of physics etc. has now and then been touched upon by the Shariah, it is only by way of an auxiliary instrument and as a proof of some argument in metaphysics, which, as we shall soon show, is one of the objects of the Shariah. It is borne out by the fact that the physical phenomena have been referred to in the Holy Qur'an as:

لأيات لأولى الألباب (القران)

“Signs for the people of wisdom’’ (3:190)

            Thus, we are left with only one branch of Theoretical Philosophy- that is to say, metaphysics- and with all the three branches of practical philosophy. Since all of them are involved in the attainment of the aim mentioned above-that is, fulfilment of the two kinds of obligations-, the Shariah has dealt with them fully. As for the perfect way in which the problems of Practical Philosophy have been expounded, even the followers of the Greek philosophers have had to admit that “the Islamic Shariah has fulfilled this need in the most perfect manner and with all possible details.”

            And, in the case of the problems of metaphysics too, a comparative study of the arguments on the two sides- Greek philosophy and Islamic Shariah- obliges the philosophers to make the same admissions.

            Thus, the first subject of discussion which properly comes within scope of the Shariah is metaphysics (‘Ilmul-ilahiyyat), one subdivision of which is the “science of doctrines and beliefs” (Ilmul-aqaid), dealing with topics like revelation (Wahy), Prophet-hood (Nubuwwah) and Life after Death and the Day of Judgment (Ma'ad). The second subject of discussion is Practical Philosophy which has been subdivided by the Shariah into (a) the injunctions with regard to the relation between man and God-‘Ibadat; (b) the injunctions with regard to the relations between one man and another- Mu’amalat; (c) the injunctions with regard to the relations between man and society- Mu’asharah[2]; and (d) the injunctions with regard to the relation between a man and himself- Akhlaq. (And these divisions are not different from that of Tahdhib-e-Akhlaq, Tadbeer-e-Mazil and Siyasat-e-Madaniyyah but are interrelated with each other and can be understood with little consideration.[3])

            In short, the sciences which properly belong to the Shariah are five- the four which we have just mentioned, and the science of doctrines and beliefs. We do not propose to deal with all these five elements, but with only those things about which people with a western education have sometimes come to feel a doubt. Since these doubts are related to belief. The purpose of all our discussions would, in this sense, be to deal with only one element-namely, doctrines and beliefs. Although the proper order would have been to take up for discussion all the problems pertaining only to one of these divisions before turning to the problems of another kind, yet for the sake of making the discussion more attractive and delightful to the readers, it was found more suitable to treat all kinds of problems in a composite way. So, all that we have to say will, with the help of Allah, be presented in this form in the subsequent pages.

            For this book we have chosen the title “Intimations" (Intibahat). These very intimations, in fact, form the main object of this book. Before dealing with the chief topics, we shall explain certain fundamental rules, which stand as First Principles in relation to the topics of discussion. While discussing the main topics, we shall have occasion to refer to these rules from time to time, so that one can easily understand and accept what is being said. May the Almighty Allah help us!

Ashraf Ali

Thana Bhavan,

Muzaffar Nagar,

UP, India

 



[1] Household administration

[2] In translation, Mu'asharat has been mentioned before Mu'amalat, here, the order is changed according to the original Urdu text.  

[3] The translation in brackets is added as per the original text book.